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In continuation of a student project initiated in the 
. . 
last quarter of academic year 1968-1969, the editorial staff 
of the Management ~uarterly is pleased to present to its 
readers a number o course work papers submitted by students 
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The papers were 
selected for their excellence in terms of broad-based appeal, 
readability , and informative value. 
A continuou s effort will be conducted by succeeding . . 
editorial staff members to consider for publication all student 
papers submitted from every educational and research department 
at NPS. · It is t he editors' opinion that this expanded approach 
to the Management Quarterly will benefit the readers by pro-
viding a broad sp ectrum of interesting topics within or related 
t o the general f ie l d of military management and/or operations. 
In order to ens ure a continuous input of student papers 
to the editorial staff, a Student Mail Center box (SMC 1499) 
has been designated for Management Quarterl~ use on a permanent 
basis. Submission by faculty members of suitable midterm 
papers, research work, and term project reports will be 
accepted at any tim e. We also believe that the Quarterly 
offers students the un ique opportunity to have their research 
efforts recognized , an d we invite those students who feel that 
their recent academic efforts might be of interest to others 
to provide the edit or i a l staff with a copy of the work involved . 
0 
We wish to thank all faculty members for their cooperation 
and assistance in i dentifying papers for possible inclusion O 
in the Management Quarterly. We are particularly grateful 
to Commander J. C. Tibbitts , Jr . , CEC, U.S . Navy , Professor D. B. 
Burke; and Professo r J. Valenta for the time devoted to 
reviewing the paper s wh ich are published in this issue . Our 
appreciation is ext en ded in acknowledgement of the guidance 
provided by our advisor , Lieutenant Commander R. W. Sagehorn, 
U.S. Navy; as well as the invaluable encouragement and 
assistance of Commander J. T. Fleming , U.S. Navy; Lieutenant 
Commander J. D. Monza, SC, U.S . Navy; and the staff of the 
Administrative Scien ce Curricular Office . 
0 
0 
The views expr e ssed in the Mana~ement Quarterlt are 
those of the authors exclusively, an in no way ref ect the 
attitude or endorsement by the Department of Defense, Navy 





CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UN ION 
By MajoJi. Valla.ce L. Meehan, USAF 
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While much has been written on the apparently popular 
subject of the U.S.-USSR arms race and the strategic bal-
ance, relatively li t tle attention has been given to a very 
significant, though undramatic element of that balance. 
An examination of tha t element, the Soviet civil defense 
program, is the purpose of this study. Highly analytical 
discussions on the strategic balance have been published, 
and some allude to the "massive and meticulously planned 
civil defense effort" of the Soviet Union,l or state that 
Soviet civil defense is well developed and should be con-
sidered.2 But for the most part U. S. policy makers and 
policy debaters continue t o discuss deterrence, Soviet 0 
strategy, arms limita t ions , and the strategic balance 
without adequately consi dering the important element of 
Soviet civil defense and its implications. Perhaps as 
Dr. William Scott has pointed out, writing in the Summer 1975 
edition of Strate gic Review: 
There is a s t range reluctance in the West to 
examine Sovie t writings .. . It is much easier to sit 
on the fence and speculate what course the Soviets 
might take. A t horough analysis of Soviet publi-
cations on military matters, combined with known 
facts about Soviet weaponry could present expla-
nations of Soviet behavior (and beliefs regarding 
nuclear war) that would be uncomfortable to study. 
In an attempt to ove rc ome the reluctance referred to 
by Dr. Scott, an impor tant source of information for this 
paper has been news rele a ses and editorials that have 
appeared in Soviet publications. I have relied principally 
upon translations of the U.S. Joint Publications Research 
Service (JPRS), "Transla t ions on USSR Military Affairs," 
and the National Technical Information Service of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce . 
Accepting information contained in Soviet publications 
at face value is often criticized. While a certain amount 
of rhetoric and bureaucratic propaganda is to be expected, 
the carefully controlled Soviet news media plainly reflects 
official governmental position. Inspection of the Soviet 
media therefore, can reveal valuable information concerning 






The USSR has a history of inconspicuous development of 
imP,ortant projects that are often clouded by myths and pre-
conceptions harbored especially in the West. Soviet civil 
defense preparations have received little publicity in W~st-
ern news media, as did their work in space technology prior 
to the launching of Sputnik in 1957 . Soviet literature on 
military strategy and nuclear war clearly points out that 
the Soviet Union believes that nuclear war is possible, and 
even more important, that it is survivable . The prestigious 
Military Strategy : Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, edited by 
Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, indicates that c!vil defense is 
an important element in strategic defense. While leading 
U.S. theorists and military strategists have often viewed 
the massive use of nuclear weapons in terms of total destruct-
ion of civilization , and therefore politically and morally 
"unthinkable," this view is not shared by their Soviet 
counterparts. 5 Dr. Malcolm Currie, Director of Research 
and Engineering with the U. S. Department of Defense, emphasizes 
that Soviet politico-military thought not only considers 
nuclear war as "thinkable," but indeed, perhaps inevitable. 6 
Since the mid - 195O's, when the Soviet Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Georgi Malenkov, spoke of the destruction of world 
civilization, and was sharply admonished by Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev, the prevalent Soviet attitude has been that the 
USSR would survive a nuclear war. Rear Admiral V. Sheliag, 
one of the Soviet Union's leading military spokesman , is 
reported to have expressed his opinion that while it is 
claimed in the West that humanity and world civilization 
would perish in the event of nuclear war, Marxists-Leninists 
have always considered thermonuclear war a great calam~ty, 
but harbor no sentiments of hopelessness or pessimism. 
There can be no doubt that civil defense plays an important 
r.ole in Soviet strategic thought . 
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 
Civil defense in the Soviet Union dates back as far as 
the 192Os when the thesis of the "inevitability of war" 
between the USSR and the capitalist powers was a basic part 
of Communist dogma. Articles appeared in Soviet magazines 
as early as 1923 that dealt with the civilian defense against 
ch~mical weapons . Civil defense planning began in earnest 
in 1931 with emphasis placed on the threat of incendiary 
weapons used in air attack on cities. Hitler's accesston to 
power and aggressive overtones led the Soviet Union to build 
bomb shelters and to develop a civil defense organization . 
The first nation-wide civil defense training program was 
launched in 1935, and some 38 million persons were given a 
2O-hour civil defense course and awarded badges of completion , 
3 
"Ready for Air and Chemical Defense, 1st Grade. 118 Efforts 
were stepped up following the Gerwan attack on the Soviet· 
Union to the extent of general mobilization of the population. 
Civil defense training was made compulsory for all men and · 
women between the ages of sixteen and sixty in July 1941. 
During the course of the war it is estimated that some 137 
million persons received civil defense training.9 
Interest in civil defense declined following the end of 
World War II, and compulsory training of the population was 
discontinued. The par-military organization Dobrovolnoc
10 Obshchestvo Sodeistviia Armii, Aviatsii i Flotu (DOSAAF) 
was organized in 1951, and the following year participation 0 
in a 20-hour civil defense course was made compulsory for 
all of its estimated 15 million members. Until 1954 however, 
Soviet civil defense training suffered from a failure to 
appreciate the significance of nuclear weapons.11 Mention 
of atomic weapons first appeared in Soviet civil defense 
manuals in 1954, and in 1956 the threat of bacteriological 
weapons was included. Since then, Soviet civil defense
1
2as 
been concerned with the entire range of modern weapons. · 
In an interview with Henry Shapiro in 1960, Premier Khrushchev 
boasted that the Soviet Union would survive a nuclear war, 
emphasizing the strategic edge afforded the Sovie!j due to 
greater dispersal of its population and industry. Delib-
erate dispersal of industries away from population centers 
has continued to be an integral part of the Soviet Union's 
long-term civil defense program. 
The progra m was given an authoritative boost at the 
Twenty-Third Congress of the Conununist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) in 1966 when the Central CollTIDittee called for 
increased emphasi s on civil defense . 14 This was acted on 
by the government which passed the "1967 Law on Universal 
Military Duty," Ar ticle 17 of which calls for compulsory 
civil defense tra i ning in primary. secondary and technical 
schools throughou t the Soviet Union . Implementation of 0 
the law resulted i n every Soviet school child receiving 
some 115 hours of civil defense instruction by the time 
he cqmpletes tent h grade.15 
By 1969 the Soviet Union was publishing civil defense 
handbooks and oth er publications which have been carefully 
studied by the Oak Ridge Civil Defense Research Project who 
found them to be n oteworthy for their practicability and 
completeness, esp e cially their plans for the evacuation and 
dispersal of the urban population into the rural areas. It 




handbook had been published in the United States, that 
personnel of Oak Ridge translated thel969 edition for the 
National Technical Information Service of the U.S. Department 
of CoI!llllerce. 10 
III. CURRENT ORGANIZATION 
Civil defense is organized throughout the Soviet Union 
on a territorial-industrial basis. It involves all branches of government as well as all plants, institutions, schools, 
11kolkhoze 11 or collective farms, and "sovkhoze" or state 
fa,:ms, virtually including the entire population. Respon-
sibility for the implementation of the program is shared by 
party, government, administrative, and industrial leaders. 17 
By elevating the direction of the entire civil defense pro-
gram to the deputy defense minister level during the 1973 
structural and organizational changes of the Soviet high 
cpimDand,18 the program is now given official regard on a 
p~r with the military services. 
Below the national level, civil defense follows the 
ter~itorial-administrative organization of the Soviet union 
with a civil defense chief assisted by a permanent staff at 
every level of government. In each republic for example, 
the deputy minister for internal affairs heads a staff of 
~ivil defense officials r e sponsible for all civil defense 
p;-ograms within that republic. Next, at the "oblast" or 
re~ional level, the organization will be headed by the chief 
administrator, usually the chairman of the provincial 
~xecutive committee . Still further down the governmental 
structure is a "rayon " or county civil defense organization, 
and a city or villag e or ga nization. Below the city or 
village level, civi l defense i s broken down and organized 
by economic unit . An urban economic unit might be a factory, 
school, or office complex, while a rural economic unit 
might be either a collective farm or state farm.19 
Th~se economic units at the local level constitute the 
operational level or civil defense, for here one finds the 
basic civil defense uni t o f the Soviet Union, the f ormation. 
as well as various sub-units such as brigades, cells, 
~etachments, teams, or squadrons. Formation sub-units vary 
in size from three to eight persons, and perform the spe-
~ialized functions such as decontamination, connnunications , 
{ire fighting, emergency medical treatment, veterinary 
services, and sanitation. In the case of smaller factories 
and installations, or villages with only 200-500 residents , 
formations will consist of 11unitarnoye 11 or all-purpose sub-
units, staffed by individuals who are trained in specialized 
~kills.20 
5 
IV. CURRENT POSTURE 
In 1972, about the time the Strategic Arms Limitation 
r 
Treaty (SALT) agreements were signed, the Soviet Union 
initiated a major effort to upgrade its civil defense pro-
gram. Only a few months after the signing of the Anti 
Ballistic :Missile (AB~) Treaty, the position of Chief of 
Civil Defense of the USSR was elevated to the Deputy Minister . 
of Defense level, and filled by Colonel General A. T. Altunin, 
who in 1973 ordered a complete review of the program. The 
major outcomes of tha t review were embodied in the present 
Soviet civil defense posture, briefly outline here. O 
Soviet civil defense is divided into three separate task 
groupings. The first group are those measures related to 
the protection of the population and includes evacuation and 
dispersion procedures, and the construction and preparation 
of protective shelters . The second group is concerned with 
measures that increase t he survivability of industrial 
facilities and centers of production. The third group are 
those tasks related to emergency repair and rescue operations 
as well as techniques and procedures for decontamination.2~ · 
The entire Soviet c iv i l defense program considers all steps _ 
necessary to guarantee population and industrial survival 
in the event of nuclear war. It is interesting to note that 
to a large degree the Soviet program embodies the findings . · 
and reconnnendations resulting from the United States Strateg~c 
Bombing Survey of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, a study undertak~n..1 !... 
with painstaking care to assess
2
.the precautions necessary ; , 
to survive future nuclear wars. 2 
Until as recently as 1975, the keystone of the entire 
Soviet civil defense posture has been evacuation and dispersion 
of civilian personnel from urban centers. Even with the _ 
recent shift in emphasis to the reliance on shelters, evac-
uation and dispersion continues to be a necessary and im-
portant defensive measure. For example, during the last 
decade 80% of all new industry has been dispersed to some . 
one thousand small and medium-sized towns with an emphasis . 
on bomb-resistant construction, low building density, and 
the stockpiling of a one-year food supply for workers and 
livestock.23 
Evacuation and dispersion has progressed well beyond 
the planning stage . and mass exercises involving the popu-
lations of entire villages in rural areas, and entire in-
dustrial units in urban areas have been carried out . For 





Sevastopol) was evacuated during an exercise by a refrig-
eration fleet located at the local port. Even housewives 
and retired persons were evacuated to "SEPs" (combined 
evacuation points)which contained various types of shelters 
and emergenc y sup plies.24 
In Tallin, capital of the Estonian Soviet Socialism 
Republic (SSR), the city's taxicab fleet was mobilized for 
exercises in evacuating people from the city, driving 
through areas of simulated fire and radioactivity.25 The 
exercises also included demonstrations of procedures for 
decontaminating vehicles under field conditions using mobile 
facilities, and the o~eration and use of radioactive 
detection equipment.26 According to official government 
handbooks, the Soviet Union ' s plan for evacuation includes 
the use of all means of transporation: railways, cars and 
trucks, riverboats, ships, and airplanes. Dispersal areas 
are located fro m 60-80 kilometers (37-50 miles) from city 
centers. It is intended that only essential workers and 
supervisors will be dispersed, and all others evacuated to 
outlying rural areas.27 
A recent Soviet publication, Civil Defense Yesterday 
and Today by K. G. Kotlukov, has indicated a shift in the 
• Soviet concept of population protection. While evacuation 
.and dispersal is still essential, the basic method of pro-
tecting the population is
2
yow alleged to be sheltering them 
in protective structures. The degree to which this policy 
change has been implemented in terms of actual construction 
is certainly subject to question and beyond the scope of 
this report, but would make a suitable area of investigation 
for attache and intelligence personnel. 
Soviet civil defense authorities consider protective 
shelters within two broad categories: (1) shelters designed 
to protect against inunediate effects of nuclear weapons such 
as blast, light, and thermal radiation, and (2) dugouts 
(emergency shelters intended to protect against fallout) 
that can be built rapidly by unskilled citizens during crisis 
escalation. The Soviets also stress adapting cellars, silos, 
and storage rooms to emergency shelters by reinforcing with 
props or posts, and providing shielding with a layer of 
earth above the ceiling.29 An integral part of civil defense 
plans in the major cities is the use of subways as mass 
public shelters. Photograhpic evidence of the Moscow subway 
equipped with blast doors was introduced in Congressional 
Hearings in March of this year.30 Estimates are that the 
Moscow subway could shelter some one million Soviet citizens . 
7 
i 
While not general l y given credit for operations from 
a technologically sophis t icated base, Soviet civil defense 
operations were employing mobile radio communications sys~ 
terns for dispatch and control of mobile repair and technical 
service equipment as early as 1971, even in rural areas. 
Mobile repair and technical service equipment is normally 
assigned to all district administration areas that contain 
either collective or state farm production units. These 
units were being equipped with RSV-1 ultra high frequency 
radiotelephone sets as replacements for older Nedra-P 
sets which had a less effective range.31 
V. EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
The Central Committ ee of the Twenty-Fourth CPSU, in 
1973 again increased the i mportance of the civil defense 
role in the Soviet Union. Instructions by the Committee 
called for restructuring and improvement in all areas of 
civil defense, bu t emphasis appears to have been on tech-
niques and quality of training and education. It is in 
the area of trai n ing that Soviet efforts excel. 
Civil defense training has been compulsory in the Sov-
iet Union since 1954. A total of six training courses were 
given from 1954 t o 1973, t ot aling some 104 hours of instruction 
for all men sixteen t o sixty and all women sixteen to fifty~ 
five years of age. In 1972 a course was introduced into 
the second grade school curriculum, consisting of five to 
six hours taught ·in 45-minute sessions throughout the 
scho ol year . This cour se was de signed to conc en t rate on 
0 
the use of gas mas ks and has required the students to actually 
wear them for a mi ni mum of ten minutes each period. In 
preparation for t eaching the course, all second-grade teachers 
must have attended a two- to-three day civil defense refresher 
course.32 Increased emphasis on t he education of young 
schoolchildren has a l so been seen in an increased availability 
of civil defense literature appearing in public libraries. 0 
There have been several new books and brochures, even novels, 
which deal with nuclear war and its effects, all specially 
designed for the "poorly t rained reader" and young child.33 
Civil defense education in secondary and higher technical 
schools was completely revised as recently as 1975, and 
beginning in 1976, all high school and technical school 
students have been giv ~n a fifty-hour block of training at 
the instruc t or level.34 These courses have been designed 
to provide them wi t h th e means to protect themselves and 
the population, as well as to fulfill duties of command-
leader positions in civil defense formations. They are 





Another rec ent embellishment which began in 1975 was 
''tbe introduction of a series of twenty annual exams that 
are compulsory for all citizens. Regardless of previous 
.training, all persons are now required to annually "reconfirm 11 
by taking the complete battery of tests. Included is a 
demonstration of the proper fitting and opera 3;on of gas masks, . and the operation of a geiger counter. 
While civil defense education and training has been 
stressed since 1954, recent emphasis has been on practical, 
realistic exercises. Colonel-General V. Grekov, Deputy 
Director of Civil Defense f-or Political Affairs, in 
criticizing the older methods of conducting exercises, 
referred to them as "meaningless exercises, reduced to 
notification and assembly of personnel, in-ranks inspection, 
and verbal testing of knowledge. 1136 
The degree to which the Soviets stress practicability 
and realism in their exercises can be seen in numerous exam-
ples since 1973. For example, an exercis -e conducted last 
year for power plant installation personnel in the Karelian 
Republic involved the replacing of insulation on power poles. 
simulated rescue of electrocuted persons, the rendering of 
emergency medical aid, and the actual erecting of several 
p_oles and stringing electrical cable for a 35 kilo-volt 
power transmission line. The entire exer-cise was carried 
out by workers wearing gas masks and full protective clothing.3 7 
l:rn another exercise held last year in the Kazakh Republic, 
all citizens of the Leni~skiy Sovkhoz (state farm) partic-
ipated in a simulated nuclear blast and fallout alert. 
Emergency shelters were constructed using dirt bags, bricks, 
and lumber. According to reports , within minutes of the 
air alert and threat of radioactive contamination signals, 
all residents were in the shelters and the village was 
empty.38 In a civil defense exercise conducted at a rail-
road car repair plant in Novorossiysk in 1974, participants 
were commended for their realistic approa ch to the simulated 
~uclear attack. Road scouts in protective clothing were 
dispatched to check for radiatfon levels. A decontamination 
detachment headed by the deputy shop chief washed down shop 
walls with powerful jets of water from fire hoses, and young 
women in protective .suits and gas masks, "members of the 
medical team, practiced first aia . 39 
An interesting innovati-0n under the leadership of civil 
defense chief Colonel-General A. T. Altunin, was the 
devel.opment of special civil defense training areas complete 
witb full-scale mock-ups and training compounds . 40 One 
9 
such training area was constructed in the city of Aktyubinsk 
of the Kazakhskay a SSR in the form of a minature village 
measuring 150 by 200 meters, which can accomodate three-
to-four exercises per day . Designed primarily for exercise~ 
in decontamination, fire-fighting, emergency medical care, 
and rescue operations, this training compound reportedly 
cost only 12,500 rubles (approximately $16,250). More 
elaborate facilities constructed in Klev, Kazakhstan, and 
the Ukraine range in cost from 60 , 000 to 73,000 rubles 
(approximately $78,000 to $94,900).41 
Should one take comfort in the belief that Soviet 0 
accounts (from which all of the reports in this study 
come) may overrate the effectiveness of civil defense 
exercises, let me point out that there is no hesitancy on 
the part of Soviet au t horities to publicly criticize those 
measures that fail to measure up to expectations. An 
inspection of the civil defense program in the Komi SSR 
conducted in 1974 severely cri ticized·,responsible officials 
for failing to create a full-sized training compound. It 
was also pointed out that th e established five-day training 
courses for civil defense units consisted of nearly 50% 
classroom lectures, slide pre$entations and movies, with 
insufficient "practical time 114Z - - again reminiscent of · 
disaster control training courses given in the U.S. military. 
The civil defense staff of an industrial unit in Chita 
was publicly scorned in 1975 for poor scheduling of required 
exercises, specifically for not scheduling exercises in 
the Winter months. The attention of responsible officials 
was called to other i ndu s t rial units in Chita which had 
effective programs , and the 1bwere encouraged to "draw the necessary conclusions." 
VI . CONCLUSIONS 
What are the implications of Soviet civil defense? 
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 
this year, T.K. Jones, one of this nation's foremost experts 
on civil defense and technical advisor to former SALT 
negotiator Paul Nitze , detailed the result of studies con-
ducted to determine the survivability of the Soviet Union 
in the event of nuclear war. The findings were nothing 
short of alarming to the distinguished members of the 
committee, but should come as no shock to readers who have 
patiently followed me thus far. 
Summarized, Jones' report disclosed that if the entire 
U.S. retaliatory arsenal were delivered against the Soviet 





be destroyed. And even if retaliation was directed at 
counter-value targets of population centers, simulation 
of a conservative Soviet evacuation effort, assuming no 
shelter protection from either blast or fallout, fatal-
ities would number some 20 million or about eight percent 
of the population. Further simulation that assumed the 
availability and use of even simple shelter facilities 
of the dugout variety, would reduce fatalities to less 
44 than two percent of the population, or some six million . 
While this is not intended to be a comparative analysis, 
it may help to put these statistics in better perspective 
by referring to results of a post-nuclear attack study 
(PONASTII) conducz 5a by the U.S . Defense Civil Pre-paredness Agency. The purpose of PONAST II was to 
determine the survival and recovery prospects of the 
United States following a hypothetical nuclear attack by 
the Soviet Union. The postulated attack of PONAST II 
resulted in
4
a 57% U.S. population loss - some 145 million 
fatalities. b 
There appears to be a tendency for Americans to 
believe that Soviet civil defense is a myth, or merely 
a ploy of Soviet propaganda, and that in the final analysis 
it will not work or does not exist . Such false hopes, 
while comforting, are dangerous. United States strategic 
thinking must reassess the role of civil defense as an 
important element in the strategic balance. 
11 
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YUGOSLAVIA'S FOREIGN THREAT 
AND ITS TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCE 
AS A DETERRENT 
by 
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EWLope (GV 3268). 
The Ecli.toltli 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II the word "deterrence" has practically 
been synonymous with the prevention of nuclear war. Litera-
ture on the subject is voluminous, but comparatively little 
·has been written on the deterrence strategies of non-nuclear 
nations. Those scholars who have become interested in the 
application of deterrence theory to non-nuclear conflicts 
for the most part restrict their studies to the use of non-
nuclear forces within the framework of potential escalation 
to a nuclear exchange. 
Yet the vast majority of the world's nations possess 
neither weapons of their own nor firm superpower cormnitments 
to provide a defensive nuclear umbrella. Not only are such 
nations without a nuclear deterrent, but most also lack 
assurances that larger powers would lend conventional support 
against an aggressor. Thus many countries have been left to 
their own devices in the creation of an adequate deterrence 
and defense. Most of these lie beyond the periphery of 
Captal.n Ui.c.ha.el J. 01GJr.a.dy, U.S. Ah.m!J, 1tec.elved fu B.S. deglLee ~n 
Geo_qlta.phy 61tom Ve.Pa.rd Unlv~liy. He i.li p,teoen:tly a c.a.ncUdate 6011. 
the M.A. deg1Lee .in Na.:ti.onal Sec.Ultliy A66a,il[.lJ at :the Na.val. Poi..tglf.a.duate 
Sc.hool. 
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superpower interest and for that reason have been excluded 
from major alliance systems. Other nations, though important 
to the powerful states, consciously avoid defensive agreements 
and the system of deterrence which they entail in order to 
maximize whatever freedom of action might be available 
during periods of crisis, coexistence or war. 
One such nation is Yugoslavia. Important to both NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, it is a member of neither. Yugoslavia 
eschews nuclear and conventional defense cormnitments from 
both blocs. It reasons that alliances would seriously 
impair its independence and possibly involve it in conflicts 
of foreign origin. 
By rejecting inclusion in either bloc, Yugoslavia opted 
to bear the full responsibility for its own defense and the 
deterrence of potential aggressors. Having taken on this 
responsibility, Yugos lav leaders faced the problem of how 
to allocate limited resources to meet their defensive ends. 
Another task has been to convince their more powerful neigh-
bors of the seriousness and effectiveness of Yugoslav defen-
sive preparations in order to deter them fro~ attack. 
Yugoslavia has a unique political and historical expe-
rience; a special threat to its sovereignty has evolved 
from that experience. Furthermore, Yugoslavia has employed 
unique measures to deal with that threat. This paper is 
intended to evaluate the success of Yugoslavia's deterrence 
and defense policies in view of its distinctive threat and 
response. Yugoslavia also serves as an excellent case study 
for the larger question of how small or moderately sized 
socialist nations might under similar circumstances achieve 
independence from Soviet control. This paper, then, hope-
fully has a utility greater than what might be derived 
from the study of the Yugoslav threat and defense system 
alone. 
First, this paper will evaluate the threat against 
Yugoslavia as it is perceived by the nation's leadership 
and population . An understanding of that threat, and the 
historic background against which it is framed, go a lo~g 
way toward explaining the rationale for creation of the 
Territorial Defense Force, Yugoslavia's response to the 
threat. In the second section relatively more emphasis 
will be placed on an examination of the Territorial Defense 
Force (TDF) than on the Yugoslav People's, or regular, 
Army (YPA) because the TDF constitutes the major proximate 




radical innovat ion in defense plan ning. The next section 
will concentrat e on an analy sis of the TDF - its roles, 
missions, organiza ti on and capabi li t i es. The final section 
will offer conclusions on th e effe c t iveness of the Yugoslav 
defense forces and policies as a det err ent. Although it 
is difficult to det ermine what role Yugoslavia's military 
preparations have had in t hwarti ng past aggression, this 
paper will provide some i ndi cati on of the degree of effec-
tive deterrence Yugosla vi a may po ssess in the future. 
II . THE THREAT TO YUGOSLAVIA 
O Yugoslavia i s s t ill a young na t ion. Born out of post-
World War I interna ti on al agreements, the n ew nation united 
independent regions wi t h s everal othe r t er r itories recently 
acquired from the Austro-Hun gar i an and Ottoman empires. 
Seldom has a nascen t natio n been provid ed at its outset with 
less cultural coh esio n than was Yugoslavia . Not all of its 
citizens were Slav ic , nor eve n Christian; the nation was 
populated by more than ten di stinct ethnic groups who spoke 
almost as many languages; t hre e separate systems of script 
were commonly used th roughout the lan d. But the newly 
christened "Yugoslavs " di d share geo graphical proximity 
0 
and, as much as they share d unity i n an y cultural experience, 
they possessed a colllI!lon her i tage of fo r eig n hegemony and 
bloody opposition to the various al ien administrations. 
The interwar period was ch aoti c. Regimes rose and fell 
with alarming frequ ency. The twenty yea rs between wars 
witnessed Yugos l av exp er iments in democracy, dictatorship, 
monarchy, and mili t ar y government. Meanwhile, ethnic 
separatism brewed und er the s urf ac e of Yugoslav politics 
and periodically er upted in strident Cr oat or Slovene demands 
for autonomy fro m th e successive Ser bia n-dominated regimes. 
But World War II again broug ht a modicum of unity to 
lugoslavia's various ethnic gr oup s. The German invaders 
in 1941 took advantage of se par atist se nt iment among several 
nationalities and di smembered the cou ntry through annexation, 
occupation,and cre a t ion of puppet regime s . l Although some 
Yugoslavs, particular ly i n Croatia and Slovenia , actively 
supported this parti ti on, t he major ity of the population 
rose in united oppos it ion t o Axis political control. 
The stru ggle which ensued can only be described as one 
of the most epic and uncompromising guerrilla defenses in 
history. The nation suffered greatly for its heroic resis~ 
tance. Yugoslav sources admit that the National Liberation 
Army, or connnunist partisan connnand , sustained 730,000 
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casualties and that the general population incurred almost 
one million additional dead. Furthermore, "over 50 per 
cent of the industrial and mining potential was destroyed; 
transport was virtually paralyzed" and "over 60 per cent 
of all livestock was destroyed."2 Yet, despite fratricidal 
war between the NLA and the Chetnik forces under Mihailovic, 
the resistance persisted with unabated tenacity. 
By late 1943 the National Liberation Army had tied down 
more than 31 Axis divisions in Yugoslavia.3 And by May 1945 
Yugoslav forces managed to drive all but scattered enemy 
remnants from national territories. The NLA had received 
considerable support from the Allies, consisting primarily 
of supplies from the British and Americans and strategic 
aid in the form of a military offensive from the Soviets, 
but the fact remains that, by the time the Soviet Red Army 
entered Belgrade in October 1944, the Yugoslavs had effec-
tively won their own liberation. 
Marshal Tito had conunanded the National Liberation Army 
and emerged as the political leader of a reconsolidated 
Yugoslavia. A Croat himself, there was no one in whom 
the spirit of Yugoslav nationalism burned hotter. Tito 
rapigly moved to eradicate vestiges of separatist sentiment 
and to impose political solidarity under the League of 
Cormnun isits of Yugoslavia. 
Tito a t first appeared to have instituted a doctrinaire 
pro-Soviet regime in Yugoslavia. The Soviet economic model, 
for instance, was initially used as a basis for Yugoslav 
redevelopment. Nationalization of the means of production 
and collectivization of agriculture wer~ initated; central 
control of the economy was implemented.4 In foreign affairs 
Tito actively encouraged the postwar spread of connnunist 
influence by provisioning Greek partisans and allowing 
their use of Yugoslav territory as a base of operations 
against the central government in Greece. 
Tito, however, soon became disenchanted with his country's 
ro l e within what later came to be known as the "Socialist 
Conunonwealth." In 1948 he announced an economic program 
which was in serious conflict with Soviet plans.5 At issue 
was t he Yugoslav desire to develop a self-sufficient economy 
versus the Soviet intention that Yugoslavia should provide 
resources in exchange for finished goods of Russian manu-
facture. This conflict (as well as the general question of 
Yugoslav au t onomy within the international Communist political 
system) led to Yugoslavia's exclusion from the Council for 






trade with the nations of Eastern Europe, Stalin evidently 
felt this measure alone to be sufficient to chastise Tito 
and return him to the Soviet fold.b He was badly mistaken. 
The break between Moscow and Belgrade has persisted 
at fluctuating levels of intensity to this day. Tito's 
insistence in 1948 on national self-determination of 
economic planning catalyzed or served as justification for, 
his subsequent doctrines of political independence and non-
alignment. From 1948 to the present Tito has managed to 
maint,ain Yugoslavia's independence outside the orbit of 
direct Soviet influence. 
From 1948 to 1968 the threat from the Soviet Union 
remained basically economic. Cut off from trade with 
Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia turned increasingly to the West 
for aid and gradually transformed its economy into a market, 
or profit, motivated system more in line with that of its 
new trading partners. Tito also relied heavily on the West 
for military assistance7 to his predominantly conventional 
armed forces. But Tito was ever wary of establishing 
overly intimate relations with the Western powers. Not 
only did Tito sincerely believe in his policy of non-
alignment, but he also sought to avoid intervention by 
either bloc because one perceived Yugoslavia to be in-
creasingly reliant on the other.8 As tenuous as his situ-
ation was, Tito never felt that Yugoslavia's independence 
was seriously threatened during the two decades beginning 
with his split from Soviet influence in 1948. The events 
of 1968, however, were destined to impact heavily on Tito's 
threat perception. 
' The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 
came as a shock to Tito and the Yugoslav people and raised 
fears that Yugoslavia might be dealt with similarly. Two 
months after the invasion Tito declared that the Russians 
"do not like our social order, they do not like our system, 
they do not like our road tQ socialism and communism, they 
do not like our democracy. 119 This acknowledgement of the 
fact that Yugoslavia had served as a thorn in Moscow's side 
and as an example for other nationalistic-minded socialist 
nations since 1948, plus the implications of the newly 
articulated "Brezhnev Doctrine" which condoned Soviet inter-
vention anywhere within the "Socialist Connnonwealth" when 
Moscow decided communist principles were in danger of 
compromise, sent a collective chill up the spines of nearly 
all Yugoslavs. 
Nor was the reawakened threat merely a matter of per-
ception. Tito had been closely identified with Dubcek and 
the 1968 Czech reforms; now the Soviet, Polish, East German, 
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and Bulgarian press loosed a bitter propaganda campaign 
blaming Tito for Czech "revisionist activity" which made 
the intervention necessary.10 Bulgaria also renewed 
agitation over its claims to portions of Yugoslav territory 
demanding that Yugoslav Macedonia be returned to its 
"rightful owner." As if to underwrite this claim, the 
Soviet Union, for the first time since World War II, 
transferred several divisions of troops to Bulgaria. 11 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union again began to pressure 
Romania to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers inside that country . 12 
If conducted , such maneuvers would both retard Romania's 
growing independence and serve as a potential vehicle, much 
in the same way as similar exercises had camouflaged the 
Czech invasion, for intervention in Yugoslavia. 0 
Tito's imrnediate reaction to the Warsaw Pact intervention 
in Czechoslovakia was threefold . Toward the Soviets Tito 
was concilliatory. He pl yyed down Yugoslav fears of an 
imminent Rus s ian invasion 3 and sought to assure the Soviets 
that Yugoslavia was in no danger of slipping into the Western 
system "or of abandoning its socialist position. 1114 But 
at the same t ime he discreetly brought the military to a 
high state of readiness, called up some reserves, requi-
sist i oned civilian vehicles and cygducted a wholesale distri-
bution of arms to the population. Tito further signaled 
Yugoslav intentions in a series of fighting speeches. In 
October 1968 Tito declared that "whoever tries to jeopardize 
our independence and sovereignty will encounter the iron 
will of our people. 11 16 The next month, in comparing what 
the Yugoslav response would be to a Czech-type intervention 
he stated that" ... in our country it could not be as in 
Czechoslovakia. Even though we might want to, we would not 
be able to compel the people to l ook on peacefully. 11 17 And 
in 1969, during a visit from Andrei Gromxko, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister, Tito pointed out that 'spheres of influence 
stop at the Yugoslav frontiers . 11 18 The third facit of Tito's 
post-Czechoslovakia response was on the diplomatic front. 
He met with Nicolae Ceau~escu, the Rumanian leader, within Q 
days of the Czech intervention;l9 and in mid-November Tito 
held discussions with Nicholas Katzenbach, the American 
Undersecretary of State, in Belgrade.20 
Thus it can be surmised that in Yugoslav eyes a definite 
threat grew out of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. 
It may never be known whether the Soviets seriously consid-
ered intervening in Yugoslavia during this period, but it 
is safe to conclude that Tito's policy at that time was 




Manifold political and military threats to Yugoslav 
sovereignty have persisted since 1968. The "nationalities 
issue" has been raised again in the 1970's, spearheaded 
by the Croatian separatist movement. Tito has repeatedly 
quashed vocal Croatian demands for greater autonomy under 
Yugoslavia's policy of decentralized economic and political 
control. In Tito's view a resurgence of separatist tendencies 
would lead to the collapse of the Yugoslav state and invite 
foreign interference. This is particularly true if strident 
nationalist sentiment is being kindled, as Tito suspects, 
by the Soviet espionage apparatus in an effort to divide 
the population and return the country to Russian hegemony.21 
The Yugoslav leadership also views the consolidation 
of balanced superpower blocs as a threat to their country. 
According to the platform of the Tenth Congress of the League 
of Yugoslav Communists, "the nuclear balance that has been 
struct, making a general nuclear war less probably that it 
was before, has simultaneously potentiated the danger of 
local and limited wars being used as a means of establishing 
domination. 11 ZZ 
The threat of Soviet military intervention is still 
real to the Yugoslavs. Soviet warnings that Yugoslavia's 
internal policies were endangering "the primacy of communism" 
in Yugoslavia were combined with demands for aircraft over-
flight and ship docking privileges in 1971.z3 Several weeks 
later the Soviets staged a provocative military maneuver 
named "Yug" ("South") on Hungarian soil featuring an armored 
advance toward the Yugoslav border2 4 and in 1975 the Austrian 
government announced the discovery of a Soviet contingency 
plan to occ~~y eastern Austria enroute to an invasion of 
Yugoslavia. 
In the face of these various threats Tito has settled 
on equa~ly diverse solutions. He has attempted, by repression 
as well as decentralization, to solve the nation's divisive 
internal problems in order to present a unified front against 
alien interference. He has sought to institutionalize his 
political reforms as well as his policy of non-alignment 
and international cooperation so that continuity will be 
assured in what is bound to be a hectic period following his 
death or retirement. Tito has also reinitiated careful 
discussions with the United States aimed 2~ balancing Yugoslavia's 
military dependency between the two blocs. Finally, since 
1969 Tito has created and enlarged a national militia, the 
Territorial Defense Force, to serve as the major deterrent 
against direct military intervention. It is this last organi-
zation that will be examined in more detail for the remainder 
of this paper. 
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III. RATIONALE FOR TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCE 
The preceedi n g section implied several factors in 
Tito's decision to rely on the TDF as a deterrent to foreign 
invasion. But before describing the TDF's mission, capa- · 
bilities,and organization it might be wise to briefly 
reiterate why the TDF was created. 
As explained, t he treat to Yugoslav sovereignty takes 
many forms. But in considering only the direct military 
threat, three basic scenarios can be envisioned: (1) nuclear 
warfare in Europe, (2) invasion by a small neighboring 
nation without the assistance of other nations, and (3) in-
vasion by the forces of a superpower, with or without the 
aid of its bloc allies. Yugoslavia would be defenseless 
against the first type of threat; its most meaningful 
action during an atomic war would be to limit damage in-
flicted on its own population. On the other hand, an 
invasion by a nation bordering Yugoslavia, if not actively 
supported by a major power, could be repulsed by the 
Yugoslav People's Army, a conventional, and highly profes-
sional force of approximately 230,000 men.27 But while 
neither of these two eventualities is considered likely, 
since 1968 the threat of superpower intervention has pre-
occupied the planning of Yugoslav military strategists. 
At present strength the YPA could not hope to match a 
determined big power invasion in either manpower or equip-
ment. Furthermore, Yugoslavia possesses insufficient · 
resources to maintain a conventional force at the level 
necessary to deter or defend against such an attack. So 
if the YPA is helpless in the face of the most realistic 
threat to Yugoslavia, then what alternatives remain to 
defend the nation? 
0 
Drawing on its memories of World War II, the Yugoslav 
leadership decided to create a second army - a mass, or 0 
partisan, militia. Such an army, by virtue of its size, 
tactics, will, and intimate knowledge of the area of operations, 
would constitute at once a significant deterrent to foreign 
aggression and a potentially powerful defender of the nation. 
Lightly armed , it would not be prohibitively expensive; 
well trained, it could supplement the YPA in other than 
,strictly guerrilla-type missions; highly motivated, this 
citizen army would perpetuate the tradition of mass resistance 
most recently displayed during World War II. 
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IV. THE TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCE 
The National Defense Law of February 1969 and Article 
254 of the Yugoslav Constitution established the Territorial 
Defense Force. The organization was justified under the 
Leninist maxim of the "armed people" who create a bastion 
of freedom which turns "all soldiers into citizens and all 
citizens able to carry arms, into soldiers. 11 28 Ostensibly 
directed against no particular opponent, the TDF is clearly 
a response to the Soviet military challenge.29 
By 1974 known TDF strength was estimated at one million 
O men.30 The Yugoslav goal is a TDF force of three million, 
or more than 25 per cent of the entire male population . 
0 
The first large-scale TDF maneuver was staged in 
October 1971. During that exercise a TDF formation numbering 
400,000 men, operating as partisans or in concert with 
80,000 1PA regulars, within three days repulsed a superior 
mechaniz.ed and ai 31 transportable force advancing from the Hungarian border. · · Though probably optimistic, that 
maneuver, appropriately named "Freedom-71," provides a 
rough idea of how the Yugoslav armed forces intend to defen~ 
the country in the event of invasion. 
The Yugoslav Constitution denies the right of any citizen 
to "acknowledge any capitulation or occupatiQn of Yugoslavia," 
such an act is "punishable as high treason . 1132 Accordingly, 
Yugoslav strategic doctrine calls for defense of its borders 
and all other territory. A massive blitz attack would be 
met initially by the YPA, whose job would consist of blunting 
the invader's spearhead for a few precious hours. Accom-
plishment of this mission is critical. Success of the holding 
action would permit the retention and organization of populous 
border regions and buy time for the orderly nationwide 
activation of the TDF. After TDF mobilization (Yugoslav 
sources claim that half the TDF could be mobilized within 
three to six hours and the remainder within one day33) the 
YPA. would disengage from its area defense and adopt more 
flexible tactics. 
At this point the TDF and YPA would operate in tandem 
under the tactical command of the YPA. Seeking to inflict 
maximum damage on the invader, forces would conduct static 
or mobile defense, partisan operations and even counter-
attacks, if local superiority were assured. All urban 
centers and industries, as well as open territory, would 
be defended; only the direst necessity would permit retreat. 
Every Yugoslav would fight. If the invader should never-
theless succeed in occupying large areas of the nation, 
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conventional tactics would be discarded in favor of a 
partisan war of attrition under local defense commands . 
T~is "to~al nat;gnal defense" would continue until ultimate 
victory is won . 
The TDF is legally and doctrinally co-equal with the 
YPA. But, wheras the YPA is a truly national organization 
encompassing Yugoslavia's various ethnic groups, the TDF 
is organized on a regional basis. The government of each 
of the nation's six republics and two autonomous regions 
is ultimately responsible for raising, training and funding 
its own TDF formations; only general guidance and YPA 
technical support is furnished by the central government. · 0 
Units are organized at the factory, municipalit~ and 
republic or region levels. All TDF units have the primary 
mission of defending their individual localities or 
c0Dm1ercial enterprises. Arms consist of indigenous rifles, 
machineguns,and light anti-tank weapons; all arms are 
readily available in nearby depots. Civil defense forces 
parallel the TDF structure; these paramilitary form, 5ions are thought to presently include 1. 3 million people . 
This combination of TDF, YPA, and civil defense forces, 
together with the TDF's tactical doctrine, would appear to 
constitute a considerable safeguard for Yugoslavia's 
security. Yugoslav military writers maintain that, even 
if an aggressor succeeded in winning the bulk of the 
nation's territory, population, and transpo~tation net, 
an occupation force of two million troops3° would be 
required to truly subdue the country. Such an effort 
might easily become a prolonged and frustrating task . 
Indeed, Tito believes that the Soviet Union would be 
unwilling to spare a force of necessary strength for any 
long period of time since more critical military commit ments 
exist in Eastern Europe and along the Chinese border . 37 
Furthermore, Soviet failure to achieve a rapid "Czechoslovakia-
style" victory might lead to unforeseen international 0 
repercussions, 3~ including possible NATO support of the 
Yugoslavs and a superpower nuclear showdown. 
Yet the creation of the TDF is not without its negative 
aspects. The costs of maintaining three million TDF ir-
regulars under arms must present a signif i cant problem to 
the localities and republics which fina nce the program. 
Because of the disparity of wealth which exists between 
regions, TDF units are well manned and tra~~ed in some 
areas and barely off the ground in others . 
These regional forces, in the hands of local political 
leaders, also represent an unknown factor in the ethnic 
rivalries which Tito has managed to keep under control 
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during his lifetime. Determining the allegiances of the 
various TDF commands will become an important question upon 
Tito's death. The answer to this question may well decide 
whether Yugoslavia is destined to continue as a unified 
nation or disintegrate into a cluster of divergent autonomies 
open to external force. 
Finally, although the YPA has yet to voice significant 
opposition, the TDF has represented a relative deemphasis 
in t~ 0 role and status of Yugoslavia's military profession-als. Expenditures for the regular forces have incr~ased 
by over 54 per cent during the decade ending in 1974, 1 but 
in future competition for scarce resources entrenched paro-
chial interests may serve to undermtne the TDF's importance 
in the national defense structure. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Deterrent value is judged in relation to three criteria. 
First, forces meant to have deterrent value must appear to 
possess power sufficient to exact a high cost in relation 
to an aggressor's expected gain. Second, a potential aggressor 
must be told that such forces are directed against him. Third. 
the aggressor must believe that the deterrent forces will 
certainly be used in defense.42 
The TDF was created in the wake of the Soviet intervention 
in Czechoslovakia. Major exercises have been conducted 
against a "hypothetical" enemy attacking from Hungary. Of-
ficial Yugoslav statements repeatedly discredit the concept 
of "limited sovereignty" for members of the "Socialist Common-
wealth" and constantly reaffirm Yugoslavia's intention of 
fighting if its independence is seriously threatened . Its 
experiences in World War II underline Yugoslavian dedication 
and tenacity in defense of the fatherland. It is difficult 
to conceive how the Soviets could fail to agree that the 
0 TDF meets the second and third criteria as a deterrent force 
directed against the Red Army which will certainly be used 
if necessary . 
But have the Russians also concluded that Yugoslavia's 
Territorial Defense Force would be as difficult to overcome 
as Yugoslav planners seem to think? To date there has 
been no Soviet invasion, but that proves little.
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The Soviets 
are apprehensive of the "total defense" concept, but they 
may feel that measures taken to strengthen Yugoslavia's 
defense are a product of Tito's leadership and will decay 
after he has passed from the scene. Regional bickering could 
easily arise in the absence of Tito's unifying personality 
and the TDF might become merely a symbol of regional strength, 
or worse, a tool of separatist 11warlords 11 and their opposition. 
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Insuch a political environment the TDF would lose what-
ever deterrent value it ever possessed. The Soviets, 
if they hold such ambitions, could then engineer a swift 
military intervention, playing off region,against region 
and overwhelming the weakened regular forces. 
As plausible as the above scenario might appear to 
some, I am inclined to place a great deal of confidence in 
the TDF as a deterrent. The TDF possesses a power which 
any aggressor would never rationally challenge -- the power 
of an armed and determined population . Even if divided and 
outgunned, significt~t elements of the TDF would manage to 
carry on the fight. A decentralized command system has 
been operational for years . Arms are readily available 
throughout the country . The population is trained and 
constantly reminded of its duty and reputation for waging 
war against great odds. Enough Yugoslavs would survive an 
invasion under the worst of circumstances to pursue a bitter 
struggle for longer than an aggressor would care to become 
involved. The Soviets, I feel, would have to decide in 
advance whether they would be willing to take the issue of 
a Yugoslav intervention to the level of bloc confrontation. 
As a war in Yugoslavia dragged on NATO would become increas-
ingly interes.ted in its outcome ; such a protracted "hot" 
war in modern Europe involving one superpower could not fail 
to attract the other. This is a gamble the Soviet Union 
simply cannot afford to take . Yugoslavia has been outside 
the Soviet orbit too l ong now for Russia to risk a nuclear 
exchange in an attempt to reassert its influence at this 
late date. 
And so it would seem that rational Soviet leaders 
probably perceive sufficient power i n Yugoslavia ' s TDF 
to give them pause before launching on an aggressive course . 
Thus all three deterrent value criteria are met. 
Perhaps the Territorial Defense Force is not, after 
all,what critics have t ermed a
4
;nostalgic revival of suc-
cesses" over thirty years ol d. Perhaps it is instead 
the means by which Yugoslavia will deter future aggressors 
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This analysis of financial management in the Military 
Sealift Command (MSC) will be composed of an external over-
view of MSC and an internal analysis of its financial organi-
zation. The external overview will include a brief summary 
of MSC's historical development, an examination of MSC's 
relations with customers and higher authority, an analysis 
of authorized and unauthorized costs, a breakdown of MSC's 
business during recent fiscal years by type of traffic, 
customers, programmed and actual financial performance with 
the resultant profit-loss summary, and finally billing and 
rate procedures. The internal analysis includes a summary 
of MSC's command and comptroller organization with a 
listing of the financial management billets, an abstract 
of the significant accounting policies, a sample budget 
cycle for the fleet support program, and finally an 
examination of the current statement of financial condition. 
II. THE EXTERNAL VIEW 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
On August 2, 1949, the Secretary of Defense . Louis 
Johnson, directed the establishment of the Military Sea 
Transportation Service (MSTS). This consolidation of numerous 
agencies, including the Army Transportation Service, the 
Naval Transportation Service, the lvar Shipping Administration, 
and the Fleet Service Forces was accomplished in accordance 
with the National Security Act of 1947. The transfer of 
AIT!)y ships and functions was phased over a period of about 
a year, and the MSTS was organized through the use of 
the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) with an initial working 
capital fund or corpus of $100 million. Operating expenses 
were to be paid out of this fund and to be reimbursed by 
the shipper services; thus MSTS was not to receive direct 
appropriations but to conduct its business much like a 
commercial steamship company.I On May 28, 1956, the 
consolidation was formalized with the designation of the 
Secretary of the Navy as Single Manager for Ocean Trans-
portation by Department of Defense Directive No. 5160.10. 
The Single Manager Operating Agency for Ocean Transportation 
was MSTS with Commander Military Sea Transportation Service 
(COMSTS) designated the Executive Director for Ocean 
Transportation.2 
In addition to the initial $100 million in working 
capital, the MSTS also received an additional $21.6 million 
in supplies aboard ships and in warehouses absorbed by MSTS 
during the consolidation. During the past 25 years, $69 
million has been returned to the Navy Industrial Fund as 
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excess to operating needs and $9.2 million in supplies has 
been turned over to the organization. leaving MSC a current 
corpus of $61.8 million . j These transactions are sun:rearized 
in Appendix A. 
In August 1970, the Military Sea Transportation Service 
became the Military Sealift Command (MSC). This was merely 
a cosmetic name change as neither the organization's 
structure nor operations was affected . The change was 
initiated by the Commander MSTS to make the name more re-
flective of the commandt s evolving role as a sealift co-
ordinator and its di minishing troop transport responsibilies; 
the change also kept the name somewhat para l lel to the Air 
Force Transportation Service which had previously changed 
its name from the Military Air Transportation Service 
(MATS) to the Military Airlift Command (MAC). 
Throughout 1971 and early 1972, there was strong 
pressure from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Program Anal ysis and Evaluation) for the transfer 
of MSC's functions to the Army' s Military Traffic Management 
and Terminal Service (MTMTS).4 There was considerable 
controversy and agency pressure involved in this proposal 
which was developed primarily as a result of the evolution 
of containerized cargo movement. The issue was eventually 
resolved at the Congressional committee level where the 
proposal was rejected. 
Currently the Military Sealift Command has managed 
all ocean transportation of cargo and petroleum products 
(POL), and operated various project ships for services or 
agencies requiring an ocean-going platform for research 
or other activities. MSC's newest role has been that of 
operating fleet support ships. Since 1972 MSC has been 
operating fleet oilers and tugs with civil service marine 
personnel and small military detachments . An example of 
the diverse requirements which MSC fulfills for its customers 
was the chartering of a ferry boat on July 4 , 1976. for the 
Navy to carry personnel out to the USS FORRESTAL (CV-59) 
for the Tall Ships Review in New York City.5 A listing 
of MSC's government-owned ships has been provided in 
Appendix B. 
B. EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The most significant relationship for MSC like all 
industrially-funded activities are its customer relations. 
MSC serves all of the services in the Department of Defense 





also serves various non-DOD agencies such as NASA 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration), AID 
(Agency for International Development), and NSF (National 
Science Foundation). 
MSC receives considerable guidance from higher author-
ity in serving its customers. Administratively, most MSC 
policy is formulated by the MSC Advisory Board, which is 
chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Instal-
lations and Logistics (ASN-I&L); other members are the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management 
(ASN-FM), the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics 
(OP-04), and the Conunander Military Sealift Connnand (COMSC). 
The Advisory Board's functions are to review current major 
operations and financial performance and to consider spe-
cific issues and problgm areas requiring a coordinated 
approach for solution. Operationally, MSC ships are 
controlled by the Navy with COMSC reporting directly to 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The most recent 
extended operational utilization of MSC cargo ships was 
the Vietnamese evacuation in March-May 1975. 
C. COST ANALYSIS 
As an activity of the Navy Industrial Fund, MSC has 
very specific regulations regarding which costs can and 
cannot be ~harged through the NIF to its customers. Costs 
which are authorized include: 1) civilian payrolls, 
2) supplies, materials and provisions, 3) maintenance, 
repair, and alteration of ships, 4) activation and in-
activation of ships, 5) travel, and 6) charter or hire 
of ships. The full cost of Appropriation Purchase Account 
(APA) material is included in the authorized, chargeable 
costs; although MSC is part of the Navy Department, it 
pays for this type of material which is normally not charged 
to the actual user. This permits MSC to bill the actual 
user of the ship for these costs rather than having the 
0 Navy absorb them . 
Many categories of costs cannot be charged by MSC 
directly to its customers, but several are included in 
customer billings in various ways. Unauthorized costs 
include: 1) new construction or conversion of ships -
MSC has had ships built for long term lease which permits 
the construction costs to be charged to customers (This 
was accomplished in 1972 with the procurement of nine 
25,000 ton tankers.7), 2) military characteristics of 
ships, 3) construction or alteration of real property in 
excess of $25,000, 4) plant account material ashore in 
excess of $1000, 5) military pay - as in all industrially 
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funded activities, 6) terminal charges, 7) battle damage -
repairs could be made from reserve funds which are built-
up by charging customers, and 8) contingency requirements -
although this restriction has always been in effect , MSC 
has prior to Fiscal Year 1977 (FY-77) included the cost 
of its excess (contingency) capability in its overhead. 
Effective FY-77, the Navy will pay directly for this $4 
million annual requirement as the Air Force will also 
commence directly absorbing the $15 million annual cost 
of MAC's contingency capability . 
D. TYPES OF TRAFFIC, CUSTOMERS, AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
DURING RECENT FISCAL YEARS 
During recent fiscal years dry cargo movements have 
accounted for approximately three-fifths of MSC's dollar-
volume business. As MSC's government-owned cargo ships 
consisting primarily of the aging Victory-class have been 
put out of service, almost all dry cargo has been moved 
by commercial ship with only nine, six, and three percent 
carried in government ships in FY-74, FY-75, and FY-76, 
respectively. POL movements have constituted about a fifth 
of the · dollar-volume, with the Defense Fuel Supply Center 
(DFSC) naturally being the major customer for this service . 
The percentage of POL movement by both commercial and 
government-owned bottoms declined during recent years as 
the new Falcon-class tankers procured by the lease arrange-
ment mentioned above entered MSC operation. These tankers 
have been leased on a bareboat charter in that just the 
ship with no crew has been made available to MSC. 
A recent distribution of MSC traffic has been provided 
in Appendix C. Recently, passenger movement by MSC has 
not been a significant portion of its business as almost 
all personnel have been flown by MAC to and from overseas 
assignments. Approximately 700-800 passengers have been 
moved annually during recent years by sea when flights to 
remote areas were not available. Project ships which MSC 
operates for various services and agenc i es as research 
platforms have madeup about a tenth of MSC's dollar-volume, 
and fleet support operations have also contributed a tenth. 
This latter portion has been constantly increasing as the 
MSC fleet support fleet has expanded from one oiler in 
1972 to its present eight oilers, four fleet tugs, and one 
reefer ship. 
An analysis of FY-75 and FY-76 financial performance 
as shown in Appendix D revealed that expenses, revenues, 
and profit or loss have been programmed each year by MSC 





when losses have been incurred during the previous year's 
operations. If the losses were substantial or programmed 
profits were not realized, profits have been programmed 
for several consecutive years. MSC's long-run goal, like 
all industrially-funded activities, has been to provide 
all requested services and break-even financially. A 
view of MSC's financial operating results reveals that 
for its first 20 years of operations it fulfilled this 
goal by staying relatively close to the break-even point 
each year; however, in FY-73 and FY-74 losses totalling 
$40 million and $78 million were in~urred. 
The reasons for these sharp losses were three-folq. 
First, the drastic increase in oil prices forced MSC's 
costs up far beyond what could have been forecast as 
propulsion fuel constitutes a major portion of the cost 
of ocean transportation. Secondly, the various labor 
unions representing both the civil service mariners on 
government-owned ships and the commercial crews on contract-
operated ships all secured large retroactive wage settl~ments 
due to double-digit inflation prevailing in the mid-1970's. 
All of this was compounded by MSC's simultaneous adoption 
of a rate stabilization program for its customers; this 
prevented the adjustment of rates during the fiscal year. 
The stabilization program was highly desired by MSC's 
customers to permit appropriation stability, to improve 
management planning, and to eliminate the administrative 
crisis caused by mid-year rate hikes. The program has 
required the NIF activity to pass on profits or recoup 
losses from customers in later years. 
E. RATE AND BILLING PROCEDURES 
Dry cargo movements are charged to the shipper service 
or agency on a basis of measurement-tons-per mile (M/T/M) 
with a fixed rate being charged to all customers regardless 
of volume or route. The estimated costs to ship all dry 
O cargo requirements are totalled, and associated overhead 
costs are added, then this sum is divided by the total 
lift requirements times the mileage to produce this rate. 
(See Figure 1.) This same procedure is followed to 
determine a rate per long-ton-per-mile (L/T/M) for POL 
movements. 
Shipping Expense+ Overhead Allocation 
Lift Requirements x Budgeted Distance = rate per M/T/M 
Figure 1 
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The project ships which MSC operates for sponsoring agencies 
are billed on a basis of full cost reimbursement. The 
costs of fleet support ships are billed monthly to the 
appropriate fleet cornmander-in-chief on a per diem basis. 
Estimated annual operating expenses for each ship plus the 
overhead allocation for that ship is divided by the budgeted 
operating days to detemine its per diem rate. 
III . THE INTERNAL VIEW 
The Military Sealift Command can be viewed as a large 
organization which receives shipping or ship operation 
requirements in the form of Military Interservice Project 
Requests (MIPR's). Then considering government-owned 
and cornmercial shipping capacity together with previous 
workload statistics MSC generates force plans in the form 
of nucleus (government-owned) ship operations, and various 
commercial contract operations whicQ take the form of 
time charters (TC) , commercial voyage char t ers (CVC), and 
ba_~_epoat charters (BBC). 
-'A partial MSC organization chart is included as 
Appendix E . Commander Military Sealift Command is a 
Rear Admiral with his headquarters staff located in 
Washington; his comptroller is a GS-16. Four MSC area 
cornman_ders are also Rear Admiral billets, but the Far East 
Command (COMSCE) and the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean 
Command (COMSCELM) have been headed by Captains for several 
years. : The other two area conmtanders, Atlantic (COMSCLANT) 
and Pacific (COMSCPAC) are "two-hatted" Rear Admirals 
as they also serve as Commandants of the Third and Twelfth 
Naval Districts respectively. The Comptroller at COMSCELM 
is a Navy Connn~nder who also serves as the connnand's 
Supply Officer. The other three area commanders have 
full-time comptrollers who are Navy Cornmanders. These 
comptroll~r billets have been designated as supply corps 
billets, but are all programmed to transition to unre-
stric ·ted line between 1976 and 1980 . COMSC has submitted 
correspondence requesting · that the billets continue to be 
filled by supply corps officers, but no response to the 
request has been received. 
A. SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES 
MSC's accounting policy is directed primarily to the 
~IF . ijandbook for MSC (NAVSO P-1280 published by the Navy 
Comptroller; additional guidance is included in Department 
of Defense Directive 7410.4. At the end of reporting 
periods, MSC reports costs and revenues for nucleus and 





percentage of the voyage completed. The association cos~s 
FLnd revenues for cargo movements based on government bill 
,of lading (GBLs) are reported in full on the date of 
sailing. Fleet support and project ship costs are reported 
as they are incurred and revenues as the sponsor is billed. 
normally on a monthly basis.B 
MSC's accounting system, like that of all NIF activities. 
pperates on an accrual basis with the major exception that 
depreciation of its ships and other assets is not taken 
into account. The basis of this accrual aspect is the 
reserve funds which MSC maintains by charging its customers 
costs including monthly payments into the funds. Reserves 
are maintained by MSC for regular maintenance and r.epair 
of ships, accidental damage repairs to ships, .claims pending 
~gainst "MSC, and projec 9ed lump sum retirement or separation payments for employees. 
·B. BUDGET CYCLE 
As an example of MSC budgeting, the formulation and 
execution of the budget for a fleet support ship will be 
traced; the dates will reflect the old Congressional budget 
cycle since MSC has not yet utilized the new on~. as it 
budgeted for the transition quarter (7T) with FY-77. The 
fleet connnanders-in-chief submit their requirements (MIPR's) 
-~o COMSC in December stating the number of days each fleet 
support ship is desired to be in full operating status 
(FOS); this does not give MSC any information regarding 
,anticipated days underway. COMSC passes this information 
together with a fuel price planning figure to the appropriate 
area commanders in mid-January with the MSC budget call. 
The area commanders are required to estimate each ship'~ 
operating expenses for each cost category. Appendix F 
lists all the categories which must be considered. The 
area connnanders then submit this data together with their 
estimated overhead expenses (Appendix G lists overhf8d 
0 expense categories) to COMSC no later than 1 March . • 
COMSC then, after reviewing these inputs, submits its 
.combined budget to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in late March. 
Approval is normally received in early June, and then COMSC 
lssues its formal A-11 budget which is utilized by MSC's 
customers to insure appropriations are adequate to pay 
for all budgeted services. COMSC then forwards approved 
operating budgets to the area commanders in two forms . 
'The ship's budgets are broken down by specific account and 
sub-program. The specific account-based budget is utilifed 
for control with monthly variance reports required by COMSC 
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for each category. The sub-program budget and the monthly 
totals on the specific budget are utilized as absolute 
ceili~gs which cannot be exceeded without customer approval; 
how~ver, monthly totals may be shifted from one month to ,. 
another without external approval. 
C. · STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION 
MSC's most recent statement of financial condition has 
been included as Appendix H. It can be seen that it looks 
much like that of any corporation with assets including 
cash, accounts receivable, inventories, and other assets 
such as· deferred charges and travel advances. Included 0 
as iiabilities are accounts payable, accrued expenses, 
uncompleted voyage revenues, and reserves. The equity, 
or for a NIF activity its "capital of the fund," includes 
both the current amount of MSC's corpus and its retained 
earnings or accumulated profits (or less accumulated 
losses). MSC's current "capital of the fund" is $138,229,223 
com~osed of the 11orpus of $61,836,496 and retained earnings of ~76,392,727. MSC is programming losses in FY-77 to · 
redu.ce the retained earnings and is contemplating returning 
a portion of the corpus to the Navy Industrial Fund. 
- . ; ! 
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I nven to r i e s Donated 
Sub-t ota l 
II. Liabilities Charged Against Capital 
Annual Leave 
Claims - Bareboat Charters 
M & R Reserve 
Sub-total 
Net Capita l I - II 
III . Retained Earnings 
Beginning of Fiscal Year 
Fiscal Year Operating Results 
Exhibits Band C 
Adjustments : 
Prior Fiscal Year 
Total Retained Earnings 
Capital of Fund Total (Exhibit A) 
0 
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Current Fiscal Year 









$ 6,599,476 $. 
1,918,833 
$ 6,599 1~76 $1,918. 833 










$6I ; 836 , 496 
$( 4,413 , 714) 
(10,42 7 ,130) 
$(14,840,844) 
U6,995,652) 
$ 6 , 599,476 
70, 682,207 
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SUMMARY QF t,JSC SHIPS AND SERVICE. CRAFT - 1 ABRIL 1916 
I ·' . 
CLASS Tm'AE ' I COMSC . LANT: ' PAC: FE 
' ' 
TOTA!j 1/ 6-7 14 
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I 
29' .. Z4 
' . 
0 TOTAL ACTIVE sa M 24 Ml 
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1/ Exc-ludes-: · Two (2') YFNB'"s. ass:tgned' to MSCQ HONOLULU ... 












DRY CARGO CM/T's) 
GOV'T OWNED SHIPS· · 
COMMERCIAL SH JPS .' ·... 
PETROLEUM (L/T's) 
GOV'T OWNED SHIPS ,-
BAREBOAT·CHARTERED-SHIPS 
COMMERCIAL SH PS 
= 
0 
DISTRIBUTION OF MSC TRAFFIC 
. .. - . 
. , .. FY 16 ACT - -
FY 75 lsr 6 MONTHS 
9.,243.,139 3.,976.,838 
6% . 5% 
94% 95% 
11.,4.01.,191 . 5.,905.,998 
30% ., 16% 
21% 38% 
49% 46% 
~ ............... ~ 
-~ 






·• .. ' ~ 
..... . . .... ll.,J60:,000 ~- ~ ....... 
~ 
_. 19% '1:1 .. 1,,,. t::I z 
t1 
41% H :>c: 
t : · -40% n 
0 
CATEGORY ARMY 
DRY CARGO $ 342.8 
PET-ROLE UM -
PROJECT 0~5 
FLEET SUPPORT -I.JI 
f--1 
OTHER -
TOTAL EXPENSE $ 343.3 









·MSC EXPENSES - FY 75 
CMILLlONS F DOLLARS) 
PROGRAMMED EXP NSE 
NAVY Fa~~E Bf~fR& 
$ 123,6 $ 95,5 $ _ -
1.2 0~6 224,3 
72.5 - 17.2 4,8 
46.1 - -
... - ... 
$ 243,4 $ 113. 3 $229. 1 -
26% 12% 25% 
0 
TOTAL ACT,tf~;NsE 
$ 561.. 9 $ 534.5 
226,1 175.6 
95.0 102.2 ~ I'd 
~ 
46.l • 36.7 ~ H 
>< - - ~ 
1 
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MSC REVENUE - FY 75 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
SOURCE 
' . ARMY. NAVY j .. 
DRY CARGO $ 369.8 $ 140.5 
PETRO~_EUM - 3,4 
I . . .... 
PROJECT 0,5 -- 73.4 
FLEET SUPPORT 




I • •r,f. I J• :_ 
TOTAL REVENUE$ 370.3 $ 263.4 
-• J •] ~. ~ I I r ti 
% OF, TOJAL 37% ' 26% . 
0 
PROGRAMMED REV NUE 
AIR DFSC & ACT. RFVENUF 
FORCE. OTHER TOTAL FY 75 
I ' ,. _; -<! 
$ 103.1 • $ - $ 613,4 $ 578,1 
0. &- 248 • .3 252,5 217 ,,0 
17,2 4.8 95,9 · 103,0 J 
- - 46,1 36,7 
0,3 - - - : . I • .; .. 
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MSC PROFIT - FY 75 
<MILLIONS F nOLLARS) 
PROGRAMMED PROFIT SOURCE 
AIR DFSC & 
NAVY FORCE OTHER 
$ 16.9 $ 7,6 $ -




$ 20.0 $ 7,8 $ 24.0 
0 
ACTUAL P/CL) 
TOTAL FY 75 
$ 51.5 $ 4'3.6 
26. LJ 41.4 





- 0,3 }< 
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TOTAL EXPENSE $238.1 
% OF TOTAL 29% 
*REVISF] DEC 1975 
0 
MSC EXPENSES - FY 76 
($ MILLIONS) 
OSD APPROVED 
PROGRAMMED EXP NSE* ACT. EXPENSE 
AIR DFSC & J.sr 6 MONTHS 
NAVY FORCE OTHER TOTAL FY 76 
$105.5 $110,4 $ 7.8 $461. 8 $ 216.4 
3.5 · 1, 4 164,7 169.6 88.2 > ""d 
""d 
62.2 16.5 4.6 83,3 37.7 trj z 
t;I 
94.3 94,1 43.5 
H - - ~ 
t:, 
- - - - - I 
···--
~ 
$265.5 $128,3 $177.l . $8'J9.0 $ 385 .. 8 
33% 16% 22% 100% 
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MSC REVENUE - FY 76 
{$ MILLIONS> 
OSD APPROVED 
PROGRAMMED REV NUE* 
AIR DFSC & 
CATEGORY ARMY NAVY FORCE OT~ER TOTAL 
DRY CARGO $255.6 $ 113.3 $118.5 $ 8,4 $495.8 
PETROLEUM - 3.8 1.5 179.7 185.0 
PROJECT - 62.1 16.5 4 .-6 83.2 
FLEET SUPPORT - 91.4 - - 91.4 
.OTHE-R - - - - -
TOTAL REVENUE $255.6 $270.6 $136.5 $192 . 7 $855. 4 
% OF TOTAL 30% 32% 16~ 22% 100% 
* REVISED DEC 1975 
0 
ACT. RFVENUE 
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CATEGORY ARMY 






TOTAL PROFIT $17.5 
* REVISED DEC 1975 
0 
MSC PROFIT/CLOSS) - FY 76 
($ MILLIONS) 
OSD APPROVED 
PROGRAMMED PROFIT/(LOSS)* ACTUAL P/(l) 
-AIR DFSC & . ~ lsr 6 MONTHS 
NAVY FORCE OTHER TOTAL FY 76 
$ 7,8 $ 8.1 $ 0.6 $34.0 $27.9 
0.3 0,1 15.0 15.4 16.3 ~ 
'"ti . ti:! (0.1) -0- -0- (0,1) 0.5 z ti 
H 
(2 I 9) , (2 I 9) 1.8 :>< - -
ti 
- - - - 0.1 
°' 
$ 5,1 $ 8,2 $15.6 $46, LI $46.6 
.. , ; -





Partial MSG Organization Chart 







































MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 
NUCLEUS SRIPS EXPENSE 
FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY 1975 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1976 
Salaries and Wages, Civilian Marine 
Regular Time 
Overtime 
Compensatory Time, Civilian Employees 
Relief Officers 
Bonuses 
All Other Premium Pay 
Annual, Sick and Military Leave 
Shore Leave 
Indoctrination and Training 
Awaiting Assignment 
Employer Contributions 






Cash in Lieu of Subsistence and Quarters 
Consumable Supplies 
Medical and Dental Expense 
Transportation and Handling of Supplies 
Laundry Expense 
Port Expense 
Repairs to Special Material in Store 
Loss on Special Material by Disposal 
Loss (Gain) on Special Material by Inventory 
Ship Equipage 
Container & Related Expense 
Maintenance & Repair of Ships 
Accident and Damage Repairs 
Alteration of Ships, Unprogrammed 
Alteration of Ships, Programmed 
Extraordinary Repairs 
Miscellaneous 
Total Other Expenses 
Total Nucleus Ships Expense 
Less: Reimbursable Nucleus Ships Expense 













223 , 098 
1,152,197 
$17,906,309 



































































FOR THE PERIOD 1 July 1975 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1976 
DESCRIPTION 
Salaries and Wages Expense 
Regula:i; Time 
Overtime 
Annual, Sick and Mil i tary Leave 
Indigenous Labor 
Employer Contribu t ions 




Occupancy of Premises 
Office Equipment, Rental and Services 
Office Expenses, Stationery and Postage 
Communications 
Automotive Equipment Expense 
Operational Equipment Expense 
Office F:"quipment and Mai ntenance 
Medical Expenses, Civilian Personnel 
Cash in Lieu of Quarters 
Other Overhead Expense 
Total Other Expenses 
Total Overhead Expense 
Less Reimbursable Overhead Expenses 












































4,890 , .915' 





MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 












Material in Transit 2,.I 
Special . Material Held for 


















Total Other Assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
a/ Aged analysis of Material 
in Transit Inventory: 
1 - 30 Days 
31 - 60 Days 
61 - 90 Days 
Over 90 Days 
Total 
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MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION (CONTINUED) 










Shipping Contracts Payable W/H 
Portion 
Withholdings from Employees · 
Employees Allotments Payable 
Miscellaneous 





Total Accounts Payable 
ACCRUED EXPENSES: 
Char t er Costs 
Shipping Contracts 
GBL Shipments 
Government Owned-Contractor Operated 
Annual Leave, Civilian Employees 
Shore Leave, Civilian Employees 
Compensatory Time, Civilian ~plqyees 
Supplies and Services · 
Maintenance and Repair ,of Ships 
Shipping Agreements/Contracts ~ontainers 
Shipping Agreements/Contracts Breakbulk 
Contractual Support of Southeast Asia 
Salaries and Wages 
Employer's Taxes and Contributions 
Pay and Allowances, Indig~nous Personnel 
Total Accrued Expenses 
OTHER LIABILITIES: 
Uncompleted Voyage Revenue 
gESERVES: 
Settlement of Claim~ 
Maintenance and Repair of Ships 
Accident and Damage Repairs 
Retirement of Indigenous Personnel 
Total Reserves 
TOTAL LIABILITIES E.l 
TOTAL CAPITAL OF FUND 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL OF FUND 
·61 
$ 2,032.937 

























123,388 2 379 
$309 2486 2 782 




STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL · .C9NDITION (CONTINUED) 
AS OF 30 JUNE 1976 
J!../ Amount of MSC contracts and or ders outstanding for undelivered services 
materials and supplies not included under liabilities: 
,· ' , t :,1 I f ~ 
Maintenance and Repair Contracts $ . 5,000 $ 45,000 $ 50,000 
Ocean Transportation Charters 234,928,123 234·, 928,123 
Other Materials & Suppli es & Services 402357 961330 136,687 
Total $ 451357 $23520692453 $235 1 114z810 
.,. 
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